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Abstract: A growing public management literature has debated whether strategic management
models originally developed for private firms are also relevant to contemporary public agencies.
Thus far, it has been easier to apply strategic management models centred on competitive advantage
in jurisdictions in which new public management (NPM) reforms have left an enduring inheritance,
with the emphasis in these settings on the autonomization of public agencies and a prominent
concern with ‘performance’. Based on the case study of public agencies in the European Union,
we argue there is potential to apply strategic management models in other jurisdictions where the
penetration of NPM has been much lower, provided certain conditions of agency autonomy are met
and factors—such as stakeholders’ expectations stimulating the adoption of strategic management
models—perform as the functional equivalent of the pressures provided by NPM incentivization
systems. The paper contributes to the literature aimed at employing the discipline of strategic
management—a thriving field of inquiry business administration and management—as a valuable
source of knowledge for the advancement of public management.
Keywords: public management; public strategic management; European Union; public agencies;
research policy; educational and vocational training policy
1. Introduction
This paper considers the issue of whether the discipline of strategic management—a thriving
field of inquiry in the broader discipline of business administration and management that has so far
been underutilized in public administration—can provide valuable knowledge for the advancement
of public management, specifically, whether strategic management models can be usefully applied
to improve the understanding of decision-making processes in contemporary public agencies; and if
so, whether and how contextual differences across national jurisdictions may affect the adoption of
strategic management approaches.
A growing public management literature has debated whether strategic management models
originally developed for private firms are also relevant to contemporary public agencies (Andrews et al.
2006; Berry 1994; Boyne and Walker 2004; Bryson et al. 2010; Meier et al. 2007; Nutt and Backoff 1993).
It has so far been easier to apply strategic management models centred on competitive advantage to
settings based on new public management (NPM), e.g., the United Kingdom (UK), and to some extent
the United States (US), with their emphasis on the autonomization of public agencies, their concern
with ‘performance’ (Andrews et al. 2006) and widespread adoption of market-type mechanisms within
public services (Ferlie et al. 1996; Porter and Teisberg 2006). Reforms of the public sector inspired
by such doctrines also led to the development of performance management systems within public
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services organizations, creating conditions more akin to commercial sector firms competing in markets.
However, NPM-based jurisdictions represent a relatively limited number of countries: indeed most
countries across Europe, Asia, Africa or Latin America have only partially, if at all, adopted NPM
reforms, and further, NPM reforms may not have had deep transformative effects over the ways in
which the public sector works in some countries which superficially appear as NPM orientated. We call
these non-NPM institutional settings, and in this paper we distinctively explore whether some models
of strategic management can be fruitfully applied to such non-NPM settings. So, our main (theoretical)
research question is whether strategic management models find applicability also in low-NPM settings,
and if so under what conditions this may happen. Secondly, our related empirical research question is
what models of strategic management can be detected in these settings.
We should point out that the generic strategic management literature has since long broadened
its scope beyond conventional industrial economics and the historically influential Porterian school
centred on market competitive advantage (Porter 1980, 2008). Other schools seek to develop nonmarket
approaches to strategic management, which potentially have higher significance for application to
public services settings. Examples of alternative approaches are: the strategy-as-practice movement,
the resource-based view, the learning school, and the cultural school (see Mintzberg et al. 2009). So our
contribution is to explore the question of whether some models of strategic management can be
usefully applied to public agencies in ‘low NPM’ settings, rather than the more studied ‘high NPM’
settings where applications can already be found (Bryson et al. 2010; Ferlie et al. 1996). We argue there
is potential to apply strategic management models to low NPM settings, provided certain conditions
of agency autonomy are present, and, secondly and complementary to this argument, that factors such
as stakeholders’ expectations—acting through various non market based mechanisms—may stimulate
the adoption of strategic management models, acting as the functional equivalent of the pressures
provided by NPM incentivization systems.
We start by reviewing relevant strategic management literatures. After outlining our methods,
we present and discuss two case studies of strategic processes in public agencies in the European
Union (EU), selected as a low-NPM setting. We conclude that certain strategic management models
(namely, the collective design school; strategy as practice) are empirically evident. We then draw
out theoretical implications about the strategy process of public services organizations in low-NPM
public management settings. Ultimately, we aim to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge about
how to systematically employ strategic management models for bettering the understanding of the
behavior of public organizations in a range of public settings internationally.
2. Literature Review: The Proliferation of Strategic Management Models and Intersectoral Transfer
Several newer models of strategic management (Pettigrew et al. 2006; Ferlie and Ongaro 2015)
are evident in the wider literature; some of these approaches to strategic management have already
crossed into public management scholarship.
The initial and somewhat narrow focus of the public management literature was on the importing
of formal strategic planning in the 1980s. Berry (1994) saw its adoption as fuelled by new Reaganite
politics that encouraged American public agencies to manage better within limited resources and
curtail their old social activism; Llewellyn and Tappin (2003) explored strategic planning in national
park agencies in the USA and the UK and suggested such plans helped public managers acquire
resources from governmental sponsors and also rhetorically signalled a more managerial stance
(‘getting results’). Strategic plans were no longer ‘dormant documents’ and could act to challenge
traditional professional dominance.
Bryson’s latest version of his influential text on strategic planning (Bryson 2018) proposes a model
of a broad ‘strategy change cycle’. It incorporates processes such as organizational learning, leadership,
organizational change and iterative reflection. This model recasts strategic planning as a wider form of
practical reasoning, getting beyond seeing it as a purely rational-analytic or technical activity.
Adm. Sci. 2019, 9, 23 3 of 18
Bryson et al. (2010) literature review notes the recent proliferation of generic strategic management
models, alongside and beyond strategic planning. Perspectives like organizational learning and
knowledge management as well as the literature on the ‘practice turn’ (Johnson et al. 2007; Fenton and
Langley 2011) are considered; the latter is a powerful new prism which conceives of ‘strategy’ as a
collective, micro level, activity, best seen in day-to-day action where organizational actors ‘strategize’.
Bryson and other public management scholars sympathetic to strategic management thinking
have also suggested that generic models may require (substantial) adaptation to public agency settings.
Vining (2011) considers whether Porter’s well known ‘five forces’ framework (Porter 1979)—originally
developed for private firms—applies to public agencies. He concludes some forces can be readily
transposed, but other dimensions are more problematic: stronger political influence remains a key
modifier for public agencies.
Finally, some ‘old schools’, like the design school (Mintzberg et al. 2009), have enjoyed wide
applicability in public services settings. The design school seeks to achieve a strategic fit between a
particular organization and its environment (not necessarily defined as a market) (Ferlie and Ongaro 2015,
p. 13; Mintzberg et al. 2009). Here, strategy is normally led by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and
advisers, then handed to middle management to implement. The school suggests that ‘strategic vision’
should be simple, be bespoke to each organization (rather than following general principles) and easy
to communicate to others. It uses well-known techniques (such as SWOT and PESTEL) to analyze the
environment and organizational strengths and weaknesses (Mintzberg et al. 2009). Bryson (2018) contains
extensive examples of SWOT in American public agencies.
Importantly, there has also been a strand of literature developing approaches to strategic
management in public organisations which originated firmly within the field of public management.
This strand is often based on the authors’ heavy involvement in concrete experiences of processes
of strategic renewal of public organisations, providing original syntheses of models of strategic
management within public services organisations (Lega and Cristofoli 2009; Joyce 1999; Joyce and
Drumaux 2014).
So there are now various strategic management models applicable to public agencies, which do
not assume a firm operating in competitive markets, and which can potentially provide a repertoire
of conceptual models to interpret the behavior of public organisations through the lens of strategic
management in non-NPM institutional settings. However, we have noted from the earlier literature
review that most applications of strategic management have occurred in ‘high-NPM’ settings, paving
the way for the question explored here of whether and how strategic management based approaches
find applicability outside the relatively narrow set of countries where NPM reforms have left a
heavy mark.
Applying Models of Strategic Management to Non-NPM Public Agencies
The ‘fit’ of a strategic management model may also depend on the administrative–organizational
form of public agencies within a national jurisdiction. NPM-based reforms (Hood 1991) in the UK
and other jurisdictions created new public agency forms. Rosenberg and Rosenberg and Ferlie (2014)
define three characteristics of NPM-orientated public agencies as follows: (i) they are endowed with
some significant autonomy to operate; (ii) they face incentivization, notably performance related
budgets; and (iii) they are marketized, facing market led competition. It might be easier to apply some
strategic management models in these ‘firm-like’ settings. They then explore strategy-making in such
settings by using resource-based view concepts and market like Porterian prisms within NPM-style
UK and Danish public agencies. For example, many English hospitals are now Foundation Trusts
of the National Health Service (NHS): while they are still publicly funded bodies rather than firms
with shareholders, they have more operational freedoms, including a lifting of the cap on money from
private patients. Greve (2006, p. 165) argues Denmark is heavily influenced by NPM, with public
management reforms that contract out, deregulate, stimulate consumer choice and promote efficiency.
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Rosenberg (2011) suggests NPM reforms to Danish schools have led to increased use of strategic
management tools such as SWOT, mission statements and customer analyses there.
So NPM reforms facilitate the adopting of generic strategic management models in public agencies.
Yet comparativists (Christensen and Laegreid 2013; Painter and Peters 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert
2011) have noticed different national trajectories of public management reform, and certainly there is
no global convergence on the NPM paradigm. The potentially transformative effects of NPM reforms
(Hood 1995; Christensen and Laegreid 2013) are differentially received. The question is whether ‘high
impact’ NPM reforms are a precondition for adoption of strategic management approaches in public
agencies. To address this fundamental question, we pose the following research questions here research
questions: (i) empirically, is strategic behavior evident in non-NPM public services settings, and if so,
(ii) how should this strategic behavior be analyzed theoretically?
These questions raise issues of defining the core features of a low NPM public agency. We suggest
they are the opposite of the conditions discussed above for a high NPM agency, namely that they are:
(i) located in traditional and non-autonomized organizational forms; (ii) based on nonperformance
related funding; and (iii) do not face market conditions.
Secondly, we need to select ‘low’ NPM jurisdictions and study public agencies within them. Painter
and Peters (2010) characterize different administrative traditions, including the Anglo-American (often
‘high NPM’), and the Napoleonic (e.g., France) and the Germanic traditions, both lower NPM (Barzelay
and Fuechtner 2003; Ongaro 2009). Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) distinguish between NPM-based
jurisdictions (e.g., UK; New Zealand) and Continental European states, seen as Neo Weberian (or
‘Weber lite’) jurisdictions, including the European Union (EU) (Ongaro 2015). Pollitt and Bouckaert
(2011, pp. 257–58) see the EU administration as only open to NPM and private management based
ideas within certain limits.
A notable trend there has been the development of EU ‘public agencies’: there were just two
in the early 1990s but over forty by 2010. EU agencies are defined as governmental entities that
possess and exercise some grant of specialized public authority, but are neither directly elected by
the people, nor directly managed by elected officials (Thatcher and Sweet 2002, p. 2). Some political
science literature has considered the determinants for establishing such agencies. Distributional
conflict and the influence of the EU supranational organizations (chiefly the Commission), rather
than functional imperatives, appear to drive this process. Political compromises amongst multiple
‘principals’ (Dehousse 2008), encompassing both EU Member States and the European Commission,
help explain their establishment (Kelemen and Tarrant 2011).
EU agencies are not the product of dis-aggregation, driven by a specialization logic and the search
for higher performance: they are in these respects altogether different from NPM style executive
agencies (Pollitt et al. 2004). Quite the opposite, EU level agencies execute new public functions
previously wielded in a separate manner by the Member States: they are new entities for executing
novel tasks, not a new organizational form for performance-enhancement purposes. There is no
incentivization system built-in other than ‘Weberian’ statutory obligations for task execution and due
process. They also have a monopoly in their remit, with neither markets nor quasi-markets forming
the resource environment where they operate.
EU agencies thus display core traits which contrast strongly with NPM style executive agencies
(Ongaro et al. 2012), namely: (i) they are not established within a novel and allegedly more efficient
organizational form, but rather as new bodies for executing a public function within a traditional
organizational form; (ii) they do not have built-in incentivization systems; (iii) they are not ‘marketized’,
or operating in markets or quasi-markets. Finally, while they enjoy some autonomy, they do not reflect
a process of ‘autonomization’, or the purposeful endowing of higher autonomy to ‘let managers
manage’, within a performance-enhancing system.
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3. Research Design and Methods
This section discusses our research design and operational methods. The design is a longitudinal
and comparative case study of two EU agencies: the European Training Foundation (ETF—it may be
noted the appellation of ‘foundation’ in the official name of ETF may be misleading, as this is an agency
of the EU in all respects, and not a foundation in any legal meaning of the word) and the European
Research Council Executive Agency (ERCEA). We used this approach because our research questions
are exploratory and ‘how’ questions (is a strategic behavior evident in non-NPM settings? How can
such strategic behavior be studied theoretically?), for which this design is appropriate. The empirical
fieldwork followed an initial literature review to help us design the interview pro forma, reflecting a
theoretically informed rather than a grounded theoretical/purely inductive approach.
3.1. Case Selection
Candidate agencies were initially identified from the population of EU agencies. They needed to
have been operating long enough for a strategy process potentially to have unfolded at the time of
the empirical investigation (2011–13). We selected two cases which varied across various significant
dimensions, including:
- Age: whether the agency is relatively ‘old’ (established before 2000) or ‘young’ (established
in the 2000s); ETF was a pioneer (established in 1994); ERCEA more recent (established 2007,
operational 2009); agency age is significant as patterns of consistent decisions may take time
to form.
- Duration: whether the agency has by statute an indefinite duration (ETF), or is temporary (ERCEA
has a ‘termination date’ linked to its research program, although legally the mandate can be
renewed if the program is). Such variation may affect the strategy process, if ‘survival’ is an
implicit but overarching agency goal.
- Size: (staff and budget size): EU agencies are often ‘small’ organizations in staff terms, but
a distinction can be made between those below or just about 100 staff (small, like ETF), and
those with 300 or above (large, like ERCEA); in terms of approximate budget ETF is 20 million
euro/year, yet ERCEA 2000 million euro/year.
- Type of task: tasks typically executed by EU agencies include: Information gathering; advice;
scrutiny and inspection; authorization/adjudication; disbursement of grants/subsidies; and
service delivery. ETF evolved from service delivery to policy advice tasks; while ERCEA disburses
scientific grants.
- Corporate governance: the most diffuse governance model is a board with representatives from
all EU member states—one each—plus the Commission; as in ETF; the main alternative is a board
composed of sector ‘experts’, as for ERCEA.
- Management of scientists/epistemic communities: certain agencies rely on advice from expert
professionals, such as epistemic communities of scientists (e.g., ERCEA); others do not (ETF).
3.2. Data Collection Procedures
Our approach to data collection is based on the criterion of the triangulation of sources. So we
sought multiple sources for ascertaining the events that form the case study narratives on which the
subsequent analysis is founded. A first source consisted of documentary data—data that were accessed
include: the formal act establishing the agency; other regulatory acts; multi-year plans; minutes of
board meetings; reports and other agency ‘factsheets’; documentation of meetings; EU and sectoral
documentation on agency activities.
A second source was face-to-face interviews with selected key informants: generally, the director
general/executive director; all other agency senior executives, in both line and staff functions, forming
the top management team; governing board members (usually the chairman or deputy chairman); and
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other stakeholders. These were very senior people so the interviews were most informative. Thirteen
in-depth formal interviews were undertaken.
Many informal talks with these and other informants also took place. Some became ‘intimates’,
with whom it was possible to exchange views and ask for additional information informally.
After the literature review and pilot empirics, a final interview protocol for semi-structured
interviews was crafted. It covered: the history of the agency; history of (prima facie) strategy-making
events; and explored the formation of strategy according to different possible schools (using Mintzberg
et al. 2009 as a reference).
All questions were open-ended. ‘A priori identified’ interview questions were supplemented
with questions considered fruitful to pursue during the interview (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 547). Indeed,
many questions—most empirical, at times interpretive—emerged in interviews. Interviews were
long and lasted between one and three hours and a half. When more time was needed, respondents
always agreed. Whilst permission to tape record the interview was always asked, only some were
tape-recorded: initial interviews showed that respondents were more at ease without tape recording.
Transcripts of notes from all interviews were produced and cross-checked with respondents.
The final interviews (chronologically speaking) provided only corroborating evidence to prior
accounts (they pointed to the same ‘facts’ as ‘landmarks’ and the same actors playing a key role),
suggesting empirical saturation was reached.
In the ETF case, an additional source of data collection was attendance (direct observation) at two
conference-based initiatives where one author observed the way ETF managed relationships with its
key stakeholders.
Further data originated from direct observations during multiple site visits to the agencies. Field
notes were taken (providing ongoing commentary based on both observation and analysis). Ethical
approval from the sponsoring University was received.
3.3. Data Analysis: The Narrative Approach to Process Analysis
The unit of analysis is the strategy-making process in the two agencies. Methodologically, one
can identify alternative approaches for theorizing from process data. Langley (1999) reviews different
models: the one employed here is the narrative approach based on constructing a detailed story from
raw data. Classic examples of this genre within strategic management include: Chandler (1962) and,
for public sector settings, Barzelay and Campbell (2003). Narratives serve different purposes, which
suggest different treatments of data. First, they may be ‘a preliminary step aimed at preparing a
chronology for subsequent analysis—essentially, a data organization device that can also serve as
a validation tool’ (Langley 1999, p. 695). These descriptive (as opposed to explanatory) narratives
answer questions about ‘what has occurred’. Such early steps may lead to higher order analytical
narratives aiming to ‘clarify sequences across levels of analysis, suggest causal linkages between levels,
and establish early analytical themes’ (Pettigrew 1990, p. 280). The goal is to explore and explain case
histories, but then move to attempts to generalize analytically beyond the extant cases (Pettigrew 1990,
p. 280).
We will now present analytic narratives of both cases, followed by cross-case comparison to
develop more analytical themes and, ultimately, address our second, theory building, research question.
3.4. The Two Case Studies—Introduction
The story of the European Training Foundation (ETF) tracks how a mainly service-delivery
organization attained a policy advisory role—which can be seen as a higher-status task—within the
EU polity. The agency found a niche where it could thrive, and acquired the resources (mainly skilled
staff) to reposition itself. Such repositioning occurred over the period from the early 2000s to the early
2010s and was driven by a response to menacing circumstances (the termination of the agency was
alluded to in the early 2000s). The unfolding of events shows the importance of collective leadership
Adm. Sci. 2019, 9, 23 7 of 18
and of the appropriation of specific events as key practices whereby the new role and status of the
organization is built and legitimized.
The storyline of the European Research Council Executive Agency is of a new-born agency
becoming over a few years (2007–14) the single most important research grant agency in the EU,
shaping the criteria whereby very substantial resources are allocated (nearly two billion euros per
year). A cohesive epistemic community, strong collective leadership, and certain strategic practices
explain the unfolding of the story.
4. The European Training Foundation: A Strategic Turn from Project Management to a Policy
Advisory Agency
The ETF was formally established in 1990 and became operational in 1994. Until the early 2000s,
it was mainly engaged with delivering technical assistance services in education and vocational
training in third country recipients of EU-funded programs. Its core competence was one of project
management. Then, a major strategic turn occurred, and between 2000 and 2010 agency tasks and its
very position in the EU institutional-administrative environment changed. ETF became a provider of
high-level policy advice to these third country recipients and a major actor of vocational education
and training policies there. Staff have since been operating as policy advisors to governments in Asia,
the Caucasus, the Near East, the Mediterranean area and the Balkans.
How did it happen that this public agency changed its mandate, the core tasks, the skills
and competencies available to execute them, its key relationships and interdependencies with EU
institutions (chiefly the Commission), and more broadly its ‘position’ in the EU administrative
system? How did such a process, which we see as a ‘strategic turn’, unfold? We argue that a
set of actors—variously entering and exiting decision opportunities and interacting in various and
differentiated ways over time—jointly operated shrewdly to steer the re-orientation of the agency.
They managed to achieve legitimacy from key external stakeholders for such a turn. This process
occurred in an environment fraught with threats for the very survival of the agency. We argue that
taking a strategic management perspective allows us more thoroughly to interpret the observed
‘repositioning’. Specifically, we argue the design school combined with the strategy-as-practice
approach provides an apt theoretical framework to analyse how this strategic turn occurred.
Soon after ETF started (1994), developments in the EU-funded programs aimed at supporting
the transition of former Soviet bloc countries to democratic institutions and free market economy
provided the frame in which ETF found its well-recognised original function, namely delivering
technical assistance in vocational training (chiefly monitoring the execution of EU-funded programs).
Then the circumstances changed dramatically. After the resignation of the European Commission
executive led by Jacques Santer (in the year 1999) due to a financial scandal, reform of the governance
and management of the Commission gained prominence and led to various interventions in financial
and personnel management (Ongaro 2012, 2013). Under new regulations, the Commission was
forbidden to outsource tasks in external relations, including the technical assistance ETF was providing.
So, some in the Commission (and elsewhere) raised the issue of “what to do with ETF? Kill it?”.
Moreover, some countries originally recipients of EU technical assistance were on their way to
completing EU accession, hence becoming members of the board of the agency and no longer clients
of it. The new financial regulation also reduced the need for a monitoring agency. The situation had
suddenly become fluid and had at stake the role and the very survival of the agency.
However, the transforming environment was bringing not just threats, but potential opportunities
as well: whilst former accession countries were exiting the remit of ETF, the nascent European
Neighbourhood Policy would make new countries enter the scope of EU external policy. At the same
time, the European public discourse known as the ‘Lisbon agenda for the competitiveness of Europe’
outlined a program of reforms marked by concepts such as ‘lifelong learning’ and ‘lifetime education’,
which opened up a new policy space for the agency.
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4.1. Multiple Actors Enter the Decision Opportunities
How was ETF to cope with the transforming environment? A decisive intervention came from
Mrs. Catherine Day, a high official representing the Commission in the governing board of ETF, later
to become the Secretary General of the Commission. The move that turned out to be a watershed event
occurred when she sent a letter—specifically, an email—to various officials within the Commission,
which circulated widely and in which she outlined a ‘vision’ for ETF. The main thesis was that ETF
should become a source of expertise and support to Commission Delegations (EU ‘embassies’ in third
countries) and that its task should be to shape the education policy of the recipient countries, so that
they were ‘aligned’ with EU goals. Project management tasks would be outsourced for the most part
to the recipient countries’ governments.
Actors in different DGs of the European Commission reacted differently; but a decisive
intervention came from within the agency. An external evaluation had been commissioned to a
consultancy; the central evaluative question was the future tasks and mandate of ETF: ‘what does ETF
have to do?’. The final report was delivered, and officially discussed at the Governing Board meeting
in late 2002. The at the time director Peter De Rooij and his aides exploited the opportunity to comment
on the evaluation report before its final adoption to stress the passage about the opportuneness to cast
a new mandate for ETF. A breach was introduced which triggered the process that eventually led to
the recasting of the mandate: the recommendation was made for ETF to adopt ‘a new clear statement
of the overall mission’. Soon after, the Director of ETF of the time intervened in front of the Education
Committee of the European Parliament, one of the two EU legislative bodies. The other legislative
body, the Council of Ministers, which is formed by the governments of the EU Member States, was also
targeted by the ETF director. This process eventually led to the recasting of the founding regulations
and the new competencies that were incorporated in the mandate of the agency.
4.2. The ‘Torino Process’: Stakeholder Fora Seen as a Strategic Practice
Such a ‘proactive’ stance from the ETF director, however, was not his initial one: he earlier resisted
the prospect of abandoning the ‘project monitoring’ tasks and the threatened downsizing of ETF that
could go with it. A meeting that marked the collective perception about the need to change and gave
shape to a shared sense of direction was the Advisory Forum held in November 2003, with partner
countries, member states, and the Commission. The subject of the meeting was ‘learning matters’
and suggested ETF could showcase—and was on that occasion recognised to have the legitimacy to
provide—three kinds of knowledge: of vocational training and education policies, of the recipient
countries (where ETF had been operating over a decade), and of the administrative functioning of EU
programs. The forum was conceived by a close aide of De Rooij, Peter Grootings, who first envisaged
the prospects associated with embracing a new role for ETF. After this event, ETF started to have a
conscious perspective, a kind of shared vision, about what it was to become.
A second forum was held three years later, in 2006: the 2006 forum demonstrated the importance
of consulting and of networking in EU neighbouring countries where ETF was active. The third forum
held in 2009 formalised the so-called ‘Torino’ process (ETF is located in Turin, or Torino in the Italian
language). In sum, the 2003 forum performed a catalytic function for the initial strategic turn, whilst
successive events and the triggering of the Torino process performed the complementary function of
developing and consolidating the new ‘vision’ of ETF as a provider of policy advice.
4.3. Building Capabilities
The unfolding of the strategic change that occurred at ETF requires the recounting of another
event when a major program called TEMPUS was taken back from ETF to the Commission and
reassigned to another agency. This event occurred in 2005–06 when another director, after the expiry of
the second mandate of De Rooij, was in post. The new director, Muriel Dunbar, had general managerial
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competences but no specific knowledge of the field of vocational training. She addressed the issue of
what to do with the staff that used to work at the program:
“The bargain was: ‘you keep the budget, we move away the programme, you take care of the
people’. And we did it, in a number of ways: by having people move internally, to fill ETF
vacancies; or by providing career guidance support to find another job (in the Commission,
or in the executive agency that took care of TEMPUS); eventually, only two people remained.
Only later we could fill ten to twelve new posts to hire staff with the new skills required).”1
The process was painful (and resulted in some judicial appeals) and absorbed most of the energies
of the ETF director serving in the role that time. However, eventually, ETF managed to ensure that
most posts could be kept on the organisation chart, and they then firmly proceeded to replace the
existing staff with new staff possessing different skills required for the policy advisory role, such as
education economics.
4.4. Interpreting Strategic Change through the Frame of the ‘Design School’ and the ‘Strategy-as-Practice’ Approach
What form did strategy take in this case? In some respects it was explicit: formalised in documents
exchanged with the Commission and other EU institutions and approved by the governing board and
in legally binding EU acts. It may also be interpreted as deliberate: from the letter sent out by Mrs
Day and addressed to the decision makers involved in recasting the mandate of ETF, to the public
hearings made by the pro tempore ETF director in front of the competent parliamentary committee.
A clear vision for ETF was championed by certain key actors from the early phases of the strategic
change process. In other words, strategy in the case appears to be both formalized and deliberate
(Mintzberg et al. 2009).
Content-wise, the novel and threatening circumstances that took shape around 2000 were mostly
regarded as provoking a misfit between the changing environment (interpreted as a set of external
threats and opportunities) and the internal configuration of ETF (seen as no longer adequate to the
environment), for which a bespoke solution was sought. The subsequent changes to the statute and
hence mandate of ETF are a reflection and embodiment of the strategic turn that occurred, hence in a
sense ‘policy change’ was driven by strategic change, rather than the other way around.
Put together, these elements—strategy as a deliberate attempt to lead the organisation by certain
key actors, strategy as searching for a proper fit between the organisation and the environment, strategy
as ‘bespoke’ and unique to the organisation—fit well with the design school of strategic management,
aptly summarised by Mintzberg et al. (2009, chp. 2).
However, the original design school often assumes one individual (typically the CEO) to be the
pivotal actor and the architect of the strategy. In this public agency setting, the initial framework has
to be amended to accommodate the presence of a collective actor—some individuals composing it
even being institutionally affiliated to other organisations—as ‘the strategist’. Importantly, in fact,
the story points to the joint action of actors who entered (and exited) the decision opportunities at
different points in time as having steered the agency’s re-orientation. Jointly, they imagined, built up
capacity, and legitimated a ‘new vision’ for the agency as an EU centre of expertise in education and
vocational training. In other words, these actors acted collectively to design the new strategy, even if
each brought only a subset of the ‘components’ necessary for effecting the new vision. Indeed, they
did not have full agreement amongst themselves, nor did they necessarily behave in consistent and
unambiguous ways over time (March 1999; Talbot 2005); but the courses of action they undertook
jointly imagined, legitimated and built up the capacity needed for the new vision to become reality.
Specifically, Catherine Day provided the original vision for ETF, and strongly legitimated it, at least
within the Commission, as the parent administration with important oversight powers over ETF.
1 Interview 4, ETF executive, Turin, Italy, 3 November 2011.
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Peter de Rooij and Peter Grootings picked up such a vision, elaborated it, and communicated it
both internally, towards ETF staff, and externally, towards the European Parliament and Member
States, thus legitimating it. De Rooij’s successor, Mrs. Muriel Dunbar, set up the organizational
process of acquisition of new skills to build up the capabilities needed for the new role. The ETF
director since 2009, Madlen Serban, further developed and completed the process of building up these
capacities, aptly exploiting the ‘Torino process’, both symbolically and practically, for getting full
recognition and legitimacy by stakeholders. The theoretical underpinnings for the interpretation of
‘practices’ as embodying or making the strategy (rather than just being a manifestation of it) are indeed
provided by the strategy-as-practice approach (Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2002; Jarzabkowski et al.
2007; Jarzabkowski and Spee 2009) briefly reviewed earlier.
Summing up, the design school when combined with the strategy-as-practice approach provide a
theoretically based interpretation of how strategy unfolded at ETF (strategy as ‘fit’ between internal
configuration and external configuration, strategy as deliberate, strategy as unique, strategy as made
through key events and practices).
5. The Power of Ideas: Strategy-Making at the European Research Council Executive Agency
The program ‘IDEAS’ took shape in the 7th planning period, starting in the year 2007, of the
so-called ‘Framework Programme’ (FP7) through which the EU administers its research policy (the
third largest item in the Community budget). At the core of the IDEAS funding scheme was the simple
notion that ‘the big ideas that have made the history of mankind have first been in one mind’: the
funding of research—the reasoning followed—should help ideas with a high potential of engendering
novel discoveries to move to the experimental stage. The success factor for this policy is the ability to
identify ‘high potential’ ideas stemming from all possible thematic areas without any a priori restriction
of the topics to be funded.
The European Research Council (ERC) was set up by the European Commission as the institutional
framework to implement the IDEAS program. It is a research funding body with the goal of fostering
‘cutting edge’ research in Europe. It consists of a Scientific Council and an Executive Agency. Set
up in 2007, the Scientific Council was composed of eminent scientists across various disciplines.
It was intended to ‘represent’ the whole European scientific community and ensure the needs of the
scientific community are expressed and translated into the criteria whereby the grants are allocated.
An executive agency, named ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency), which was set up
in 2007 and has been operational since 2009, performs operational tasks in supporting the functioning
of the funding scheme.
IDEAS represented a truly novel programme and soon displayed impressive growth, administering
three thousand research projects over a time span of less than six years. The ERC reached a budget of
1.8 billion euro per year in 2013, following a steep increase in its initial assigned budget. The ERC became,
in a remarkably short time span, an authoritative voice in European research policy.
What led to such a ‘success’ story? Was it just the shrewd initial design of the public program
which determined its success, or have other factors weighed in? What is meant by ‘strategy’ in the case
of an organisation pervasively steered by its parent administration like an EU executive agency, and
whose duration is linked to the length of the program it is mandated to implement (the termination
clause)? And where is the locus of such ‘strategy’ in a governance architecture that includes an
independent Scientific Council—formed exclusively of scientists—as not just the guarantor of the
highest scientific standards but also as the ‘game-maker’ in program delivery? As we shall see, the
design school of strategic management explains an important part of this second case study story,
provided such a framework is properly qualified.
5.1. Scientists and Administrators Coalesce in Leading Strategically the ERC
The establishment of the IDEAS programme required the appointment of the members of the
ERC Scientific Council. The first round of appointments was carried out in 2005 by a ‘high level’
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panel of independent experts set up by the European Commission. The ERC started operations in
2007, at the time administratively supported by four units of the Directorate General ‘Research and
Technological Development’ (DG RTD) of the Commission (before the agency ERCEA was established).
Whilst some members were already acquainted with the EU machinery of research programmes, as
project managers of EU-funded research projects, all the prominent scholars were chosen for scientific
achievements, bringing with them ‘a vision which was totally scientific’, hence often uninterested in
the mechanics of EU research policy. The scientific Council had the final word in defining the criteria
whereby the ERC funding schemes would operate: it was ‘entrusted the entire envelope’ (to use a
practitioner’s expression), that is, the significant amount of financial resources with which IDEAS
would operate. A key task lay in identifying experts for the panels in charge of assessing the proposals
and awarding grants, while also setting the criteria according to which such panels should operate.
Some initial decisions taken by the Scientific Council had a significant impact. The first key
issue concerned funding criteria. The decision was rapidly made to proceed only along a bottom-up
approach: themes of research were not pre-identified by the ERC, but proposals could be formulated
by scientists on any topic, with no restrictions on the allocation of funds to subject areas: it was the
number of approved research project proposals which drove the allocation of money to the subject
areas. In the words of a member of the Scientific Council, ‘the power was given to scientists’, meaning
both the evaluators of the panels and the broader scientific community from which research project
proposals originate. This approach was at the opposite pole, as an organizing criterion, from the rest of
the EU Framework Programme (FP7): the thrust was to distinguish the IDEAS programme from the
other EU Framework Programmes.
The second key issue concerned how to organize what was labelled ‘first class’ peer review, to
ensure funds would be allocated only to top quality proposals. It was decided to set up panels through
the direct initiative of ERC members: it was the ERC Scientific Council that proposed and appointed
lists of scholars as panel members. Alternatives such as setting up a call for reviewers or other options
were discarded: the Scientific Council took all the responsibility for naming the names approached in
forming the panels.
A third influential decision was the portability of grants: it was decided that, should a grant
holder move to another institution, the grant (or what remains unspent) is transferred to the new host
institution, thus making grant-holders attractive for universities and other research institutions willing
to become poles for frontier research.
The executive agency was established by Commission Decision in December 2007 to implement
the IDEAS programme. It became administratively operational in July 2009. The director was chosen
amongst European Commission officials through an internal procedure. The agency was tasked to
support the work of the Scientific Council and the panels in selecting the research project proposals
received, administer the grants, and ensure compliance with IDEAS regulation. The executive agency
was organised in three departments: the Scientific Management Department (in charge of supporting
the evaluation process leading to the assignment of grants), the Grant Management Department (in
charge of the administration of the grant ‘after it has been assigned’ and through the whole life cycle),
and the Resources and Support Department (providing support services).
The first director of the agency was Jack Metthey, a senior European Commission official with
extensive experience in research policy and management. The immediate challenge he faced was
endowing the agency with enough staff to process the rapidly growing number of applications: in
the first call of the IDEAS program about 9000 applications were received, whilst expectations were
for between 2000 and 3000. The challenge was to expand the panels and find panelists: the Scientific
Council (producing lists of experts) and the Scientific Support Department (arranging their ‘enrolment’)
managed to work together effectively to set up 20 panels (across the three main domains: Social Sciences
and Humanities; Life Sciences; Physical and Engineering Sciences), that in 2008 became 25, operating
through about 1500 panel members. This development occurred over just a couple of years. A practice
adopted was to set at fifteen the maximum number of members for each panel (to facilitate internal
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coordination and cohesion among members); combined with the ceiling of 25 panels and coupled
with the practice of further ‘splitting’ funding lines when required to cope with increased application
numbers, this became a managerial “formula” (fifteen by twenty-five) whereby the Scientific Council
coped with increasing volumes.
5.2. Guiding Ideas as Ideational Bases of Organizing
The way the ERC framed the provision of research funding was shaped by two strong yet
simple ideas. First, the idea that, ultimately, ‘it is scientists to know where to go’ to move knowledge
further: it followed that, to promote research at the frontier of human knowledge, a bottom-up
approach—without a priori prescriptions about what fields of inquiry ‘should’ be privileged—was
adopted. Organisational complexities could now be narrowed down to setting up administrative
machinery whose only guiding criterion was the thorough assessment of the inherent quality of the
research proposal.
The other guiding idea was ‘big ideas first come in one mind’, in the mind of one person only
(it was Isaac Newton who discovered and formulated the law of universal gravity, or Albert Einstein
who elaborated the theory of relativity): here was a clear idea from which it followed that the kind of
research to be considered for ERC funding should be research projects whose concept and design come
from one individual scientist: it is the (potentially) big idea that one individual wants to pursue that
should be funded, and not large-scale projects—however ambitious they may be—that develop further
already established streams of scientific inquiry. This means that projects should be both innovative
and relatively simple, since one person only is to be in charge of it. The grant then allows the scientist
to set up a research team, which s/he leads as the principal investigator, but the overall project should
be small enough so that one individual may keep control of it. This meant the appraisal process should
perform the two functions of detecting the innovativeness of the project, probing its feasibility, and
assessing the quality of the applicant via their track-record. But there was no need to assess large-scale
project proposals against long lists of formal program priorities, as occurred in other domains of
European research funding. Potentially high organisational complexity was narrowed down through
a powerful filter about what kind of proposals the agency would process: that is, restrained in size and
highly innovative.
When analysed from their administrative implications, such guiding ideas (right or wrong as they
may be from the substantive epistemological viewpoint of whether such is the way in which human
knowledge progresses) filtered away the organisational complexity of arranging the evaluation of
large-scale proposals. At the same time, the sharing amongst the staff of such ideas helped permeate
the organisation with a strong sense of mission: staff conceived of themselves as contributing to
moving forward the frontiers of knowledge.
5.3. Collective Leadership and Organizational Design
Over a few years, the ERC became a major actor in its own right in the research policy landscape.
The succession in the post of President of the Scientific Council in 2010 (when Professor Helga Nowotny
replaced Professor Fotis Kafatos) and of the director of the executive agency (Mr. Pablo Amor, a senior
Commission official who was previously head of the Scientific Management Department, took office
as agency director in early 2011) did not alter the overall direction: a constellation of actors (both
internal and external) operated in a consistent way to ensure the steady growth of the ERC in terms
of its administered resources and its international standing. They pursued a stable course of action
marked by the choice to adopt a totally a bottom-up approach, whereby themes of research could be
formulated by scientists on any topic without restrictions. By taking the responsibility to appoint all
panel members upon the direct initiative of the ERC members (who suggested the scholars for the
assessment panels), as well as assuming a decisive role in defining criteria to be followed in assessing
proposals, they provided a clear direction to the novel and forming organisation and substantiated
its thrust towards asserting itself as a pivotal player in European research, and one that was there to
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stay—even though its legal foundation conferred only a temporary status upon it (the agency continues
to exist if and only if the program is renewed for another cycle).
5.4. Interpreting Strategic Change through the Frame of the ‘Design School’
Strategy in this case was composed of simple and straightforward decisions, clearly formulated
and communicated before being (rapidly) implemented, that together provided strong sense of
direction and perspective about where the ERC was heading. Certain guiding ideas provided the bases
of organizing: the bottom-up approach (the avoidance of any pre-defined thematic area), the focus
on small-scale, highly innovative projects, the ‘formula’ of the ceilings to the number of disciplinary
panels (set to 25 with the members of each panel set to fifteen). This way, the internal configuration
of the agency furnished and developed the capabilities required for ensuring consistent selection
of grant-winners and support to principal investigators across Europe, providing the ‘fit’ with the
external expectations it faced stemming from both the scientific community and EU decision-makers.
This search for agency/environment ‘fit’ suggests a picture consistent with the design school of
thought (see Mintzberg et al. 2009, pp. 23–49). However, rather than a ‘solo player’, or the CEO being
apparent as the chief strategist (Porter 2008), a set of actors again operated collectively as the strategist.
This set created a coalition, or at least a coalescing of actors operating in a cohesive way, across
epistemic and organisational borders (such as scientists and European Commission civil servants
working side by side, in the scientific council and the executive agency).
6. Concluding Discussion and Our Contribution
6.1. Empirical Contribution: Models of Strategic Management in Use
Which models of strategy were empirically evident in use? Both cases support the explanatory
power of the Design School, provided it is adapted to include a collective, composite strategist. In the
ETF case, actors entered and exited decision opportunities at different points; yet their collective action
provided for the agency’s strategic management. Indeed, they did not necessarily have full internal
agreement, but their actions jointly imagined, legitimated and built up capacity for the new vision to be
developed and implemented. Such collective action, too, produced a coalescing of actors in the ERCEA
case, where the glue of a common belonging to an epistemic community facilitated group cohesion.
In the ETF case, strategy-making additionally unfolded around key events (the stakeholders’
conferences which were dubbed as the ‘Torino process’) as ‘strategic practices’ that created conditions
for, and embodied, the strategic turn. This finding supports the Strategy-as-Practice perspective,
advocating the micro-level study of concrete strategizing practices (Johnson et al. 2007; Jarzabkowski
and Spee 2009). Such a perspective suggests the importance of strategic behavior in board meetings,
away days or a business or strategic planning exercise (e.g., SWOT), or in stakeholder conferences.
There is here a focus on understanding micro-level human agency as opposed to more macro level and
Porterian market structure. It also assumes a wider cast of actors than solely the CEO. This perspective
may fit well with public and non for profit settings as it does not assume strong markets and because it
is open to strategy-making from below, including from powerful professions often present in various
public services settings (see Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991; Oakes et al. 1998; Jarzabkowski and Wilson
2002; Denis et al. 2010): such as the scientists in the ERCEA case. The design and the strategy-as-practice
schools may therefore complement each other in explaining the forming and unfolding of strategy in
such agencies.
Summing up, our empirical finding is that strategy can form in such ‘low NPM’ settings, as EU
agencies. NPM transformative reforms are not necessary preconditions for strategic behavior to be
apparent in public services organizations. The two EU cases suggest the (collective) design school and
strategy as practice schools of thought in strategic management are evident empirically, as both do not
require market forces to be in operation.
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6.2. Theoretical Contribution: Explaining Strategic Processes in Low-NPM Public Agencies
Why, theoretically, can agencies in low-NPM settings display some internal strategic capacity and
so form their own strategy? We argue that, firstly, some conditions of agency autonomy are present
which enable the forming of strategy in the public contexts beyond the narrow case of NPM-driven
autonomization, and that, secondly and complementary to this argument, factors such as the pressure
wielded by the expectations of powerful stakeholders, acting through various non market based
mechanisms, may stimulate the adoption of strategic management models, These pressures act in this
regard as the functional equivalent of the pressures provided by NPM incentivization systems (which
are often market or quasi-market based).
Starting from the dimension of autonomy, which can be seen as both a condition and a goal
of strategic action in public agencies settings (Vining 2011), autonomy may be granted to—or won
by—public services organizations for reasons beyond conventional NPM rationales. Public agencies
which have been set up on bases other than performance-enhancement may still enjoy significant
autonomy, thus enabling space for local strategy formation, which in turn may reinforce the extent
of autonomy enjoyed. In EU agencies, conditions of autonomy, firstly, originated from statutory
prescriptions of technical-scientific independence as well as delegated formal autonomy to recruit staff.
Beyond such legal requirements, we here refer to some social science-based research which has been
carried out on the topic of the autonomy of public agencies. In a seminal work, Verhoest et al. (2004)
go beyond legal prescriptions to consider the behavioral elements enacted in such settings: ‘thus the
autonomy of a public agency refers to the level of independence vis-à-vis the government in actually
using the delegated decision-making competences’ (p. 105). Verhoest et al. (2004) consider financial
autonomy (the extent to which agency’s executives may decide on financial resources without external
approval), personnel management autonomy (executives’ control over human resources—staffing,
recruitment, reward and promotion/demotion, dismissal) and policy autonomy (in relation to policy
tools or objectives) as key autonomy dimensions of a public agency. Based on this framework, Verhoest
and colleagues’ carried out an extensive investigation into the autonomy of public agencies across
European countries—mostly jurisdictions that can be squarely placed in the ‘Low-NPM’ category.
Their research empirically shows that public agencies in continental Europe may enjoy relatively high
levels of autonomy (Verhoest et al. 2012). Extensive NPM-ization is not therefore a prerequisite for
public agencies to be endowed with significant autonomy.
More specifically, another piece of empirical inquiry shows that EU agencies also enjoy a relatively
high level of autonomy at least in some respects: a survey-based investigation of the level of autonomy
of EU agencies carried out in accordance with Verhoest and colleagues’ framework indicates that
EU agencies display relatively low financial autonomy, but relatively high personnel management
autonomy and also high policy autonomy (Ongaro et al. 2015), a finding which has been replicated
for the two agencies investigated in the later and more qualitative research work now reported in
this article.
Alongside agency autonomy, a second complementary set of factors also explains the strategic
capacity displayed by public agencies in low-NPM settings which was detected in our empirical study
of ETF and ERCEA. This second set of factors consists of stakeholders’ expectations, which can provide
further pressures toward the adoption of strategic management models by the agency. Stakeholders’
expectations in low NPM settings perform as the functional equivalent of the built-in incentivization
systems that are often found in high NPM settings and that have been deemed there to be conducive
to the adoption of strategic management models.
In sum, the argument we put forward is that a driver of strategy formation in public agencies
in low-NPM settings comes from their key and more powerful stakeholders’ expectations. Such
expectations may enable would-be strategists of the kind seen in the case studies presented here
to adopt strategic management models. So stakeholders’ expectations might perform in low NPM
settings a function similar to the one performed by built-in incentivization systems (like market-type
mechanisms) present in high NPM settings.
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To illustrate, the ambitious expectations from key milieus in the European scientific community
towards what ERCEA could contribute to European science, and the expectations by senior EU
decision-makers within the Commission about ETF contribution to education policy—under the threat
of termination—supplied a rationale for these two agencies to adopt a strategy. The specific content
of the strategy varied (expansionist in the ERCEA case, repositioning in a niche for ETF), yet in both
cases strategy was highly influential in shaping the future of the public agency.
To further elaborate on this point, we can then question through what (non-market) mechanisms
do such expectations from powerful stakeholders act on public agencies? Firstly, the ETF case suggests
that the credible threat at the senior policy-maker level of losing agency jurisdiction (up to the point
of threat of agency termination) may act as an important analogue within low NPM settings of the
pressures exercised by the top down performance management systems found in high NPM settings
(so that the attribution of threat to the situation can be seen as an activated social mechanism (McAdam
et al. 2001, pp. 43, 95). In addition, the case illustrates senior policy-makers can also provide important
support which facilitates the agency’s strategic turn.
The case also highlights the role of high internal ‘absorptive capacity’ (Cohen and Levinthal
1990), enabling a public agency to sense, absorb and then act on information about threats. ETF’s
high ‘absorptive capacity’ enabled it to respond to credible threats it perceived it its environment and
undertake a complex and rapid transformation and ‘upscaling’ of its mandate, enabling it to get out of
menacing circumstances that could have led to a very different and much more ominous outcome.
The ERCEA case also suggests a third mechanism: the operation of a process of jurisdictional
building through the successful and legitimate cooptation of scientists and their epistemic field, through
meeting their collective demands and expectations. We find parallels in (Selznick [2009] 2015)’s classic
study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in America which explored how it too sought to
generate support and build autonomy and strategic direction. The TVA was an experimental agency
in the New Deal of the 1930s, of which it became a symbol. Selznick’s interpretation (Selznick [2009]
2015, p. 67) stressed TVA’s ‘cooptation’ of established local interest groups (e.g., land grant colleges) to
build a constituency and survive in a conservative region. The ERCEA case suggests a similar pattern
with the cooptation of the European scientific community.
Ideological elements also help shape what are seen as legitimate and somewhat protected modes
of decision-making. The TVA was notable for its strong collective ideology of ‘grass roots planning’,
a claim with quasi democratic and morally suffused undertones difficult to contest. In ERCEA, the
governing council and the scientific community held strong shared beliefs that proper decision-making
was bottom-up (coming from the science) rather than top down: this ideological slant led the agency
to proceed through peer review letting scientists drive resource allocation. These beliefs—also difficult
to contest—institutionalized bottom-up scientific control over the resource allocation process and
strongly limited the scope for top down interventions.
Summing up, a combination of conditions of agency autonomy and, second and complementary,
factors acting—through a range of social mechanisms—as driving forces of strategic behavior can
explain the actual adoption of strategic management models in low NPM settings. So our two cases
empirically suggest that strategic behavior by public agencies is possible in low NPM settings, such as
the EU, just as it is in the more studied experience of executive agencies in the high-NPM setting of
the UK.
Finally, we suggest the study of strategic management in public agencies is still developing and
so far concentrated in high NPM sites. More research work to explore how strategic management
unfolds in non-NPM-based agencies may provide the grounding for, firstly and empirically, detecting
what models of strategic management are employed in a greater variety of systems, and, secondly and
more theoretically, achieving a deeper understanding of what can explain these patterns of agency
autonomy and decision-making.
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Agency Place2 Position Codification
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA Interview 1
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA Interview 2
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA Interview 3
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA Interview 4
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA Interview 5
ERCEA (European Research Council Executive Agency) Brussels Executive ERCEA interview 6
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 1
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 2
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 3
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 4
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 5
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 6
ETF (European Training Foundation) Turin Executive ETF Interview 7
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